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BLACK BOX ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 
JEFF WARD 
It seems fitting to explore issues of emerging uses of algorithmic decision-
making and artificial intelligence (AI) through an interdisciplinary publication 
like Law & Contemporary Problems. After all, the AI tools at the heart of these 
articles are being deployed in nearly every industry and in every corner of the 
globe. This small volume brings together leading thinkers in philosophy, ethics, 
data science, computer science, and law, who connect with us from Germany, 
Belgium, England, Columbia, and the United States. 
This cosmopolitan and cross-disciplinary approach offers particular value for 
the exploration of socio-technical systems where AI influences meaningful 
determinations, distributions, and allocations of rights and responsibilities. 
Precisely because AI affects personal and professional opportunities, due 
process, and the rule of law, any narrow exploration set apart from the systems it 
shapes—where myopically technological inquiries might fail to include broader 
ethical and sociological scrutiny—could be misguided and potentially harmful. 
Such narrow explorations might not only fail to prioritize the rights and values 
we hold dear but might also undermine our abilities then to govern AI and the 
effects it has on the social and political systems we aim to protect. As such, ideal 
is a forum like Law & Contemporary Problems that brings together lawyers, 
ethicists, technologist, engineers, and others to consider these socio-technical 
systems across disciplines. When seeking a positive AI future, it will take a 
village. 
Such a sprawling topic, though, also requires some constraints. As this 
volume’s title “Black Box Algorithms and the Rule of Law” suggests, we have 
imposed two constraints here. 
First, we focus on a particular subset of AI characterized as “black box AI.” 
In his article The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money 
and Information, contributing author Frank Pasquale showed that black-box 
systems are those “colonized by the logic of secrecy.”1 His article in this volume 
adds that “‘black box AI’ refers to any natural language processing, machine 
learning, textual analysis, or similar software which uses data which are not 
accessible to the data subject, or which deploys algorithms which are either 
similarly inaccessible, or so complex that they cannot be reduced to a series of 
rules and rule applications comprehensible to the data subject.” In other words, 
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MONEY AND INFORMATION 2 (2015). 
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the workings of these black box AI systems lack transparency and may escape 
our capacities for intuitive explanation. 
It should be noted, of course, that all kinds of AI tools—even those using 
simple symbolic or handcrafted algorithms that should be intuitive and accessible 
to human inquiry—might lack transparency and thus be characterized as black 
boxes.2 For example, the algorithms in the infamous Loomis case discussed below 
and herein were opaque and inaccessible not because they were complex but 
rather because they were protected by trade secret and thus off limits to the 
defendant’s review. Nonetheless, much of the present concern about black box 
AI derives from the modern technological phenomenon that the AI with the 
greatest predictive accuracy is often a kind of machine learning, including “deep 
neural networks,” that tends to add opacity. These kinds of AI systems do not 
replicate the step-by-step logic and rules that might be intuitive to us. Instead, 
they discern patterns from massive sets of examples to produce increasingly 
accurate predictions. To achieve these predictive capabilities, the networks 
discern relevant features of the data that usually are not obvious, intuitive, or 
even explainable to humans. As the use of such tools grows, so too do our 
concerns about their black-box nature. 
Why should we be concerned? If these new AI tools provide us with highly 
accurate outputs, should we care about their black-box characteristics? A 
common theme across the articles in this volume is that—in deciding how much 
we should be concerned—context matters. A second way in which this volume 
constrains the sprawling topic of AI is thus our focus on arenas in which the 
deployment of AI touches on the rule of law. 
Widely shared across the far-ranging jurisdictions of this volume’s authorship 
is a conception of the rule of law where all persons and institutions are held 
accountable to legal systems that are clear and publicly manifest, with 
independent judiciaries, and whose legal rules are applied fairly and consistently, 
enforced without bias, and explained clearly. Quite apparently, black box AI’s 
definitional lack of transparency could challenge such conceptions of the rule of 
law. Especially in arenas where AI tools assist with decision-making, opacity 
undermines demands for public transparency and for the kinds of clear 
explanations that satisfy our due process expectations. 
Even more, we need transparency into decision-making processes to ensure 
their fairness. Black box AI might undermine the rule of law by obscuring biases 
and allowing unfairness to persist unchecked. There is a growing awareness of 
both the opacity and bias concerns of black box algorithms in due process 
contexts, in part because of some recent, troubling cases. Perhaps most well-
known, when a predictive AI system labeled Wisconsin resident Eric Loomis at 
“high risk” for recidivism, Mr. Loomis challenged his resulting six-year prison 
 
 2.  This volume takes an inclusive (perhaps over-inclusive) approach to what constitutes 
algorithmic decision-making and artificial intelligence tools such that we include even simple, 
statistically-based algorithms such as the COMPAS tool discussed herein. Such a broad view assists our 
mutual project of defending the rule of law. 
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sentence on grounds that required insight into the workings of the predictive 
algorithm used as part of the pre-sentence investigation report.3 As the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court denied his challenge, the algorithm remained a black box—a 
decision-making tool unavailable to review by and without meaningful 
explanation for the one facing deprivation of liberty—because it was protected 
by trade secret law.4 For many, Loomis v. Wisconsin was a wake-up call: Even if 
this simple algorithm is not representative of some of the more sophisticated 
machine learning used widely today, in the wake of this decision, many have 
worked to raise awareness of the explanation and fairness issues wrought by 
black box AI. As noted, some have highlighted that opacity itself raises due 
process concerns where such tools are used in decision-making contexts,5 while 
others have emphasized the danger that such tools could undermine fairness and 
exacerbate inequalities.6 
Here, a moment of caution is warranted for all readers of this volume and all 
discussants about the role of AI in our society. To be sure, even our pre-AI social 
systems have involved opacity and biases. For example, as our authors De 
Mulder, Valcke, Vanderstichele, and Baeck make clear in the title of their article 
Are Judges More Transparent Than Black Boxes?, there is a long, well-
documented history of bias in sentencing and judicial decision-making. In this 
way, new forms of algorithmic decision-making—by freeing us from the limits of 
deeply-entrenched human biases—could potentially offer the opportunity to 
enhance fairness. Still, even where achieving such promise might be possible, 
many observers raise concerns about the use of AI tools in due process contexts,7 
especially where systems trained on historical data might learn and then continue 
to replicate existing biases.8 The fear, in short, is that AI systems might not 
eliminate biases but instead crystallize and obscure them. It is no wonder, then, 
that our evolving expectations would demand transparency and meaningful 
opportunities to challenge decisions that are based in some way on the workings 
of AI systems.9 Not to do so might impede the full achievement of AI’s promise 
 
 3.   State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760–61 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). 
 4.   Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice 
System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1369–70 (2018). 
 5.   See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA 
L. REV. 54, 105–06 (2019). (“automation. . .raises significant due process concerns, involving lack of 
notice and the opportunity to challenge the decision.”). 
 6.   Criminal Law—Sentencing Guidelines—Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before 
Use of Algorithmic Risk Assessments in Sentencing—State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), 130 
HARV. L. REV. 1530, 1530–37 (2017). 
 7.   See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636, 680, 692 
(2017); see Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact 
Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 46, 48 (2019). 
 8.   See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2224 (2019) (“To adapt a 
computer-science idiom, ‘bias in, bias out.’”); see also, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s 
Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016). 
 9.   See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, The Judicial Demand for Explainable Artificial Intelligence, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 1829, 1844–45 (2019); see also, Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory 
Standards in the Age of Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1251, 1256 (2017). 
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and ensure some measure of its peril. 
With this context in mind, this volume’s collection of articles provides a brief 
tour of discussions around black box AI and the rule of law that is end-to-end—
from design to deployment; wide-ranging—exploring areas of civil, criminal, 
administrative law, and more; and cutting-edge—challenging what’s next in AI 
systems where black-box issues might arise. 
In our first article, Beyond the Prediction Paradigm, authors Helm and 
Hagendorff look not only at the predictive policing technologies (PPTs) that are 
already widely used in many jurisdictions but also to the future as PPTs are 
inevitably deployed in more complex areas of criminal policing.  These uses raise 
important technological challenges for the probabilistic logic of prediction and 
concomitant ethical concerns. Even beyond the insights this article offers in this 
specific criminal policing domain, it demonstrates the power and importance of 
technologists, ethicists, and others working together to address those challenges 
and concerns. 
Páez’s Negligent Algorithmic Discrimination then goes straight to the core of 
the aforementioned concerns about opacity and bias. In an arena like 
employment where discrimination is a primary concern, evidentiary issues are 
always significant, and the recent rise of the use of algorithmic tools has 
heightened the challenges of establishing disparate treatment or disparate 
impact. Páez suggests a potential creative evolution of the law of negligence as a 
means to meet the challenges wrought by the use of AI tools in employment 
settings, and, in this way, the article serves as inspiration for the kind of forward-
looking discourse that the widespread deployment of AI demands. 
Pasquale’s Normative Dimensions of Consensual Application of Black Box 
Artificial Intelligence in Administrative Adjudication of Benefits Claims offers a 
helpful taxonomy of black box AI in administrative functions first by separating 
the analysis of such systems between those cases where claimants in 
administrative adjudications consent to their use and those cases where claimants 
either do not consent or else feel obligated to consent. The article then offers a 
normative evaluation of cases where an claimant’s consent is clear. This kind of 
careful evaluation is increasingly necessary as black box AI is used more broadly, 
implicates benefits and detriments for more and more people, and calls upon 
larger, surveillance-driven data sets. Few, if any, have done more in recent years 
to elevate awareness and demonstrate meticulous analysis than this author. 
As noted above, in Are Judges More Transparent Than Black Boxes?, De 
Mulder, Valcke, Vanderstichele, and Baeck help us to recall that judicial 
decision-making has always been fraught with black-box issues, even before the 
use of modern AI tools. In another clear demonstration of the benefits of cross-
disciplinary approaches to the issue of black box AI and the rule of law, the 
 
I also note that some challenge the very notion that transparency requirements or our current 
conceptions of explanation into black box AI would be meaningful to those harmed by AI-driven 
decision-making. See, e.g., Lillian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an 
Explanation’ is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 67 (2017). 
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authors explore the relationship between traditional judicial decision-making 
and the mathematical function maximization behind AI-driven tools. Their 
insights help us to ask better questions about rule of law and the ongoing 
challenges of uncertainty in legal outcomes. 
In the final article Seconds to Impact?: Regulatory Reform, New Kinds of 
Legal Services, and Increased Access to Justice, authors Sandefur, Clarke, and 
Teufel make clear one of the United States’ most widespread rule of law failings: 
the justice gap and the persistence of unmet legal needs for many. By providing 
an analysis of a current experiment in the reformation of legal services regulation, 
where AI tools might play a very significant role in closing the justice gap, they 
end this volume with an appropriate reminder of AI’s potential promise and the 
stewardship that will be needed to fulfill it. 
I mentioned at this outset that this volume is an international and cross-
disciplinary affair, and that describes our team of special editors for this volume, 
too. I’d like to offer my warm thanks to my co-special editors: Luciano Floridi is 
a leading scholar on digital ethics, the philosophy of information, and the 
philosophy of technology who serves as Professor of Philosophy and Ethics of 
Information, University of Oxford and Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. 
Cynthia Rudin is a computer scientist who explores how machine learning can be 
used to help humans make better decisions and who serves as Professor of 
Computer Science, Electrical and Computer Engineering, and Statistical Science 
at Duke University, where she directs the Prediction Analysis Lab. 
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